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Abstract
1. Conflicts between the objectives of agricultural production and conservation are 
becoming increasingly complex. Of vital importance to the success of conflict in-
terventions is a detailed understanding of how stakeholders react to management 
interventions as well as the influence of interacting social and political factors.
2. Across Europe, goose populations have increased considerably, leading to 
widespread impacts on agriculture and significant conflicts between different 
stakeholder groups. We used a novel experimental game to understand farmer 
preferences regarding the design of goose conflict interventions in Scotland. We 
specifically examined how three alternative interventions (government financial 
support for scaring activities, subsidies and agglomeration payments that include 
bonus payments for adoption by neighbouring farms) affect farmer propensity to 
support goose conservation interests through reduced shooting and the provision 
of sacrificial crops. We also examined the links between within-game behaviour 
and real-life attributes and attitudes of farmers.
3. We found that all three interventions were conducive to pro-conservation be-
haviour in the games. The effects of all three interventions were stronger among 
farmers who had higher trust towards other community members. Agglomeration 
payments led to increased provision of sacrificial crops among farmers with 
negative attitudes towards the current allocation of goose finances in Scotland. 
Farmers with more positive attitudes towards wildlife tourism were more likely to 
provide more sacrificial crops, and less likely to shoot in the games.
4. Farmers' real-life traits had a statistically significant but marginal impact on the 
effectiveness of financial payments, such as the number of geese being shot on 
their own lands, remoteness and crop damage by geese.
5. These game results provide evidence for the potential of innovative financial in-
struments in conflict management and their interactions with social factors such 
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Conflicts over natural resources and conservation are widespread 
in many parts of the world (Hill et al., 2017; Redpath et al., 2015; 
Woodroffe et al., 2005). These conflicts are increasingly being un-
derstood as conflicts between different stakeholder groups who 
disagree over the management of wildlife or natural resources 
(Hill, 2015; Peterson et al., 2010; Redpath et al., 2015). Besides 
the material impacts, conservation conflicts arise when different 
individuals or groups of people hold divergent values in relation 
to wildlife or natural resource management, and when the inter-
ests of one party are threatened by another (Redpath et al., 2013). 
Conservation conflicts thus involve intertwined ecological, eco-
nomic and socio-political elements. Management, therefore, can-
not narrowly focus on the ecological but must take into account 
stakeholder values and perceptions as well as the social and po-
litical contexts of the conflict (Dickman, 2010; Hill et al., 2017; 
Madden & McQuinn, 2015).
Conflicts over natural resources and conservation are wide-
spread in many parts of the world (Hill et al., 2017; Redpath, 
et al., 2015; Woodroffe et al., 2005). While largely understood 
as disagreements between different stakeholder groups over the 
management of wildlife or natural resources (Hill, 2015; Peterson 
et al., 2010; Redpath, et al., 2015), conflicts are multidimensional, 
with aspects that go well beyond divergent interests or values 
(Madden & McQuinn, 2014). For instance, stakeholders may ex-
perience material impacts, but are also affected by social, cultural, 
historical and political elements and the wider context in which 
the conflict is embedded (Dickman, 2010; Hill et al., 2017; Madden 
& McQuinn, 2015). Understanding both the material and non-ma-
terial aspects of conflicts—and their influence on stakeholder 
perspectives, values and decision-making—is therefore of great 
importance to conflict management.
Trust and equity attitudes can significantly influence the likelihood 
of seeking shared solutions to biodiversity-related conflicts (e.g. Young 
et al., 2013; Young, Searle, et al., 2016). In addition, other factors, such 
as attitudes towards a conservation policy, and experiences with con-
flict interventions can strongly influence perceptions of conservation 
conflicts and their management (Dickman, 2010). For example, where 
conservation policies have prevented farmers from taking direct ac-
tion against crop-raiding species, farmers may perceive a lack of con-
trol or ownership over wildlife as well as feelings of oppression from 
the state, and are more likely to oppose any alternative conflict mit-
igation strategies (von Essen et al., 2015; Hill, 2004).
In Europe, some of the critical conservation conflicts today 
relate to changes in land use, farming practices and policy. The 
introduction of agri-environment schemes, as well as the rapid in-
crease in protected sites (such as Special Areas of Conservation 
under the EU Habitats Directive and the Natura 2000 network) 
and targeted actions for particular species (e.g. shooting regula-
tions) all have markedly increased the populations of a number of 
species of conservation concern. This is the case for large grazing 
birds in particular, such as geese and cranes (Cusack et al., 2018; 
Fox & Abraham, 2017; Mason et al., 2018), which have also ben-
efited from increased access to the better foraging opportuni-
ties offered by intensively managed grasslands. For instance, the 
greylag goose population (Anser anser) has increased by more than 
seven times in Europe, from an estimated 120,000–130,000 indi-
viduals in the 1980s to around 960,000 individuals in the 2010s 
(Fox & Leafloor, 2018). However, while this rapid increase in 
geese is seen as one of the major success stories of European bird 
conservation (Stroud et al., 2017), geese have caused significant 
agricultural damage to farmers (MacMillan et al., 2004; Tombre 
et al., 2013; Whitehouse, 2009).
Several management options have been trialled at vary-
ing scales to reduce agricultural damage by geese in Europe 
(Bainbridge, 2017; Fox et al., 2017). Interventions range from lo-
cal-scale efforts by individual farmers to scare geese from their 
fields, to increasingly more complex and coordinated approaches 
at larger spatial scales. Such regional-scale policy encompasses co-
ordinated scaring and financial compensations to affected farmers, 
or monetary subsidies to allow geese to feed on sacrificial crops or 
alternative feeding areas rather than farmland (Cusack et al., 2018; 
Eythórsson et al., 2017; McKenzie & Shaw, 2017; Simonsen 
et al., 2017). In some cases, interventions also include lethal con-
trol measures (McKenzie & Shaw, 2017). These management op-
tions, and culling in particular, have been fiercely opposed by some 
groups and fuelled conflicts among stakeholders (BBC, 2019; RSPB 
News, 2015; The Ferret, 2019). The large variation of conflict in-
terventions across Europe and the United Kingdom and the social 
conflicts they have caused highlight the importance of under-
standing conflicts from farmer perspectives.
To date, the acceptability of alternative goose conflict interven-
tions and their impact on farmer decision-making have been poorly 
as community trust, equity attitude and real-life shooting levels. Our study high-
lights the importance of socio-political elements in fostering mutually beneficial 
outcomes in conservation conflicts in addition to addressing material losses to 
wildlife. We also show how games can help in addressing conservation conflicts in 
a wide range of settings.
K E Y W O R D S
agriculture, experimental game, geese, human–wildlife conflict, monetary incentives, Scotland
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understood. Yet, pilot or real-world interventions to address this 
knowledge gap would be difficult to implement because of costs and 
ethical concerns (Redpath et al., 2018). Also, larger scale policy options 
come with challenges with respect to coordination among neighbour-
ing farmers and cannot be easily uncovered with individual question-
naire surveys. Experimental games, where individual stakeholders 
actively participate, can help overcome these challenges by building a 
model of strategic situations in which stakeholders can interact. Games 
also offer a low-cost and low-risk tool for predicting the impacts of dif-
ferent policy interventions on farmer behaviour (Redpath et al., 2018). 
In addition, conflict situations are often politically sensitive, and stake-
holders can be wary of revealing personal opinions. Games can provide 
a safe atmosphere for investigating sensitive issues. The associations 
between individual or group traits and attitudes, and game decisions 
can also shed light on the social drivers of conservation conflicts and 
heterogeneity within a stakeholder group.
In this study, we developed a spatially explicit and dynamic experimen-
tal game to investigate farmer willingness to support goose conservation 
actions, and the factors that are conducive to pro-goose interventions. We 
specifically examined (a) the effect of various goose conflict interventions 
on game decisions (i.e. limited shooting and provision of sacrificial crops 
for geese) and (b) the links between within-game behaviour and farmer 
characteristics (e.g. socio-demographics, real-life experiences of damage 
by geese, number of geese shot on farms) and attitudes (e.g. attitudes 
towards various goose management schemes and features, institutional 
and interpersonal trust). We focused on the following three interventions: 
(a) support for scaring efforts; (b) financial payments for the provision 
of sacrificial crops in the form of flat rate subsidy and (c) agglomeration 
payments, an innovative scheme that incentivises spatially connected 
sacrificial crops.
2  | GOOSE-AGRICULTURE CONFLIC T 
CONTE X T
Geese can cause agricultural damage to grass and arable crops 
by reducing sward structure and causing soil puddling and com-
paction, which may decrease crop yield (Owen, 1990). The on-
farm costs of goose damage on Islay (an island off the west coast 
of Scotland) were estimated to be £11,000 per farm or £13 per 
goose for the 1999–2000 growing season (MacMillan et al., 2004). 
Agricultural losses derived from estimations of goose densities 
and goose droppings amounted to approximately £1.6 million on 
Islay alone (McKenzie & Shaw, 2017). Crop damage can be local-
ised, with a smaller number of farmers experiencing a larger pro-
portion of the damage (Mason, et al., 2018). On a national scale, 
the magnitude of damage can be substantial (Bjerke et al., 2014; 
Cope et al., 2005).
Various scaring methods (e.g. gas guns, scarecrows, active 
scaring) are used by farmers to chase geese away from fields. 
While individual farmers may gain from chasing geese off their 
fields as a tool for immediate solution, it needs to be combined 
with the provision of sacrificial crops or alternative goose feeding 
areas to be effective at reducing damage in the landscape scale 
(Månsson, 2017; Simonsen et al., 2017). That is, if scaring methods 
are implemented by farmers in isolation, geese may fly up to neigh-
bouring farmlands, thereby intensifying conflict among neighbour-
ing farms. However, if local farmers collectively provide sacrificial 
crops, and all scare, then most geese are corralled into the sacrifi-
cial crops keeping them off productive farmland. Sacrificial crops 
combined with scaring hold promise to reduce the agricultural 
losses caused by geese, while simultaneously ensuring that goose 
conservation objectives are met.
However, geese attracted to sacrificial crops might over-spill 
to adjacent farmlands and increase the amount of crop damage 
(Simonsen et al., 2017). Put simply, sacrificial crops may make things 
better for some farms but worse for farms close to the sacrificial 
crops. However, sacrificial crops may come at an opportunity cost to 
landowners, for example, if their provision requires foregoing profit-
able land for agriculture.
As conservation benefits might depend on spatial connectiv-
ity of land parcels, a block of contiguous land parcels may yield 
more wildlife than the same acreage scattered across the land-
scape (Auffret et al., 2015). Therefore, sacrificial crops might 
be more effective at attracting geese, and thus in reducing crop 
F I G U R E  1   Geography of study area. Experimental games were 
conducted with 84 farmers in 17 locations across Orkney [Colour 
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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damage in farmland, when they are grouped in the same area than 
when fragmented (Madsen et al., 2014). A novel payment scheme 
termed ‘agglomeration bonus’ rewards such contiguity (Parkhurst 
& Shogren, 2007).
We developed a novel experimental game—Goosebumps—that 
explicitly accounts for context-specific information on the goose- 
agriculture conflict. Using Goosebumps, we tested the effect of three 
conflict interventions on farmer decisions: (a) financial and mate-
rial support for scaring; (b) flat rate subsidy for sacrificial crops and 
(c) agglomeration payments that encourage spatial coordination of 
sacrificial crops.
Our games were conducted with farmers in Orkney (Figure 1) 
who actively manage farmlands and are familiar with the con-
text in which land and goose management decisions are made. 
In Orkney, Scottish National Heritage (SNH) and local goose 
management groups established a 5-year (2012–2017) adaptive 
management pilot scheme which mostly consisted of goose cull-
ing (Milne, 2018). However, the pilot did not result in reduced ag-
ricultural damage (Milne, 2018). When the pilot ended in 2017, 
transitional funding was provided by SNH to support self-help 
and self-financing arrangements: local goose management groups 
were expected to develop business models that generate income 




The games were designed with Netlogo, a multi-agent modelling 
environment that allows the creation of interactive and multi-
participant experiments and the incorporation of important spa-
tial and ecological dynamics (Wilensky, 1999). The game design 
thus gave us the ability to use a stronger framing to capture higher 
degrees of social–ecological complexity than has been possible 
previously (Janssen et al., 2014). Our games were adapted from 
NonCropshare, a game built around pest management decisions 
(Bell et al., 2013).
The games were played in groups of four farmers using tablet com-
puters linked via a mobile hotspot. Each of the four participants takes 
responsibility for land use decisions on a 3 × 3 grid-cell section (farm) 
of a 6 × 6 grid-cell agricultural landscape (Figure 2). Each participant 
had an equal share of the land in the game, a total of nine cells. In each 
of those cells, a player can: (a) farm the cell for private business, (b) 
farm the cell for private business and scare geese away, (c) farm the cell 
for private business and shoot geese and (d) provide sacrificial crops or 
alternative goose feeding areas, that is, sacrificial crops.
The game parameters were calibrated to reflect a realistic range 
of potential costs and benefit scenarios (the game protocol is in 
Appendix S1).
In each game round, there are a certain number of greylag geese 
in the landscape; geese decide where to go based on the ‘attractive-
ness’ of the land use options. Each land use has a weight assigned to 
it, with bigger weights meaning higher probability of attracting geese 
(Table 1). Sacrificial crops have a ‘neighbourhood effect’ of adding to 
the weight of any cell around them (in a radius 1 cell—up to 8 cells 
potentially affected). This captures the increased likelihood of geese 
grazing or foraging on farmers' lands that are close to roosting sites.
In a given round, if a farmer chooses scaring, then a subset of 
geese in scared cells leave and land elsewhere probabilistically 
based on cell weights. Scaring displaces geese with a probability 
of 0.6; displaced geese cannot return to the same cell. If a farmer 
chooses culling, then lethal shooting immediately removes geese 
from the landscape with a probability of 0.5. The number of geese 
in subsequent rounds therefore decreases with shooting efforts. 
Failed attempts at scaring or shooting imply that geese stay where 
they are. Reorientation of geese for the next round takes effect 
once all participants have confirmed their decisions in the current 
round.
F I G U R E  2   Visual representation 
of the digital farming landscape within 
Goosebumps. Game screen (a) Bottom-
left corner of the landscape is the active 
player at round 1, geese are randomly 
distributed across the landscape; the 
white coloured number is the number of 
geese on each cell. (b) Game screen of the 
active player after all four players have 
made decisions. (c) Game screen at the 
start of round 2; actions taken by other 
players in previous turn are visible. The 
scores of the active player in previous 
round is shown in the left-hand side of 
the panel. (d) Game screen showing the 
total score for each player at the end of 
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Each land use decision has different costs and benefits (Table 1). 
Geese grazing on farmed cells generate agricultural losses. Sacrificial 
crops bring no yield. In some of the treatments (Table 1), a subsidy 
and/or agglomeration bonus is given for every sacrificial crop in the 
landscape.
3.2 | Experimental design and sampling
We used a within-subject design to test the effect of four ran-
domly ordered treatments of six to eight rounds each (Table 2) on 
game decisions. The number of rounds was randomised to prevent 
participants from anticipating the conclusion of the treatment. 
Each game session began with a short practice session of three 









TA B L E  1   Parameters used in the game calibration
1. Farm 2. Farm and scare 3. Farm and shoot 4. Sacrificial crops
Yield 4 4 4 0
Subsidy 0 0 0 X [2,4,6]a 
Crop damage −0.16 per goose −0.16 per goose −0.16 per goose 0
Penalties or costs 0 −1 −2 0




None None None Adds 7 points of 
weight to all cells in a 
neighbourhood of 1b 
aIn the subsidy and agglomeration treatments, a subsidy of X points is awarded for each cell of sacrificial crops, where X is an integer taking one of 
three values [2, 4, 6]. The value is randomly assigned at the start of each game session. 





Cost of scaring 
geese off 
farmlands Agglomeration bonus
Control: No external 
intervention
None 1 0
Support for scaring 0 0 0
Flat rate subsidy 2, 4 or 6a  1 0
Agglomeration 
payment
2, 4 or 6a  1 1 for every sacrificial crop that is 
contiguous to another sacrificial 
crop, excluding diagonal cells.
aSubsidy values were randomly selected at the start of the game and kept constant for the 
remainder of the experimental session. 
TA B L E  2   Treatment conditions
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We invited all willing farmers in Orkney to take part in the games. 
We ensured we surveyed both farmers on the mainland as well as 
the smaller isles. The participants were identified through a snow-
ball approach via members of local goose management groups. We 
also actively recruited participants via social media and local media 
through articles and radio interviews. Our sample was, thus, not 
randomly selected. However, the sample summary statistics (age, 
source income, size of arable land and education) were consistently 
representative of the farming community in Orkney (Table S1; 
Orkney Economic Review, 2017). Each game participant represented 
one farm and the games took place at participants' houses. In total, 
we conducted 21 games sessions with 84 farmers across 17 loca-
tions in Orkney (Figure 1) in May, August and October 2018.
While incentivising game players by rewarding them based on 
the outcomes of their decisions may make the tasks more salient 
and hence motivate participants to focus harder (List & Price, 2016), 
our piloting in February and May 2018 suggested that introducing 
cash or in-kind payments was not appropriate. We took great care 
during the game administration to ensure that participants see the 
games as realistically as possible and consider it as a tool to express 
their preferences over the design of conflict management strategies.
The games were followed by debriefing interviews with 15 game 
participants to understand participant motivations for their decisions. 
These debriefing discussions also helped shed light on the extent to 
which participants made decisions that correspond to their true prefer-
ences. Interviewees were selected to cover the full spectrum of partic-
ipant strategies in the games, that is, those that engaged a lot in lethal 
control, those that mostly scared geese away, and those that exhibited 
varying levels of willingness to provide goose habitats. The interviews 
were not audio-recorded given the sensitive nature of the data (particu-
larly attitudes towards killing). Instead, we took notes and direct quotes 
where appropriate to aid the interpretation of the game outcomes.
We also administered a questionnaire survey after the games to 
collect information on participant characteristics, experience with 
damage by geese and attitudes (the survey is available at http://
resha re.ukdat aserv ice.ac.uk/85406 8/).
The research ethics committee of the University of Stirling ap-
proved this study (GUEP286). We explained to participants that the 
aggregated results would be published but would not be linked to 
farmer identity or farm location. All participants signed a written in-
formed consent document before participating in our study.
3.3 | Data analysis
We examined two main game outcomes measured at the individual par-
ticipant level: (a) decision to shoot geese and (b) provision of sacrificial 
crops. While these two strategies might not be mutually exclusive in 
goose management schemes, they seldom happen together at the indi-
vidual farmer scale. These two game outcomes are particularly relevant 
to the exploration of behavioural responses to conflict interventions.
We modelled these outcome variables as proportion data in a 
two-vector response variable (proportion of cells with decisions to 
shoot, or with sacrificial crops provided in a given round respectively) 
using binomial generalised linear mixed effect models (GLMMs) with 
a logit-link function implemented within the lme4 package (Bolker 
et al., 2009). Household ID was included as a nested random effect 
within game ID to account for inter-household intra-group correla-
tions. We controlled for learning by including rounds in the game and 
rounds into the entire game session as explanatory variables.
To relate behaviour in the game to attitudinal variables, we also 
included other explanatory variables from the questionnaire survey: 
(a) One aggregated measure of interpersonal trust among local com-
munities; (b) four measures of institutional trust and (c) four measures 
of equity indices (Figure S1; Table S2). We also included aggregated 
measures of farmer attitudes towards three management options 
recommended by the Scottish government to support self-help and 
self-financing arrangements (Milne, 2018). These management options 
consist of developing business models that generate income from wild-
life tourism, sport shooting and licenced sale of goose meat (Figure S2), 
each aggregated measure is the weighted factor scores of three vari-
ables generated from exploratory factor analyses with the r ‘psych’ 
package using oblimin rotation (Revelle, 2018; Tables S3a–d).
To explore the effects of real-life farming practices and remote-
ness on game outcomes, we included household-reported experi-
ences of goose agricultural damage, the total number of geese shot on 
own lands and the total travel time1 from the main city (Kirkwall—the 
largest settlement and administrative centre in Orkney) as explana-
tory variables. In addition, we controlled for other socio-economic 
variables such as age, gender, education, sources of income, area of 
arable crops, livestock and the strength of relationships in the group 
(the average measure of how well players in the game know each other). 
We also considered two-level interactions between the treatments 
and other participant-related variables (such as reported experiences 
of crop losses, trust and equity attitudes). Tables S1 and S2 provide a 
detailed summary of the explanatory variables included in our models.
Model selection was carried out using backward stepwise se-
lection of fixed effects based on the corrected Akaike information 
criterion (AICc) value (Barton, 2009). If AIC values differed by >2, 
models with the lowest AIC were selected, for models with a differ-
ence in AIC of <2, models with fewer degrees of freedom were se-
lected (Barton, 2009). To avoid multicollinearity issues, we ensured 
that there were no significant correlations between the predictors. 
The Spearman-method test showed generally low-level correlation 
between the numeric predictors (r2 < 0.3), while Pearson's chi-
squared test for categorical variables indicated no significant cor-
relations between the predictors. All analyses were conducted in R 
version 3.5.1 (R Core Team, 2018).
4  | RESULTS
4.1 | Participants' characteristics and attitudes
On average, game participants were 45 years old, had 13 years of 
formal education, owned 55.46 acres of arable land and reported 
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20% agricultural losses to geese for the past 12 months (Table S1); 
93% of participants were male. Interpersonal community trust was 
relatively high (>63%; Figure 3).
Participants generally reported negative attitudes on key 
equity indices; the share of participants who felt that the allo-
cation of finances for the management of geese in Scotland is 
fairly distributed was <7% (Figure 3). Most participants (>73%) 
also perceived inequitable participation in decision-making pro-
cesses (Figure 3). More than half of participants reported little 
or no trust towards governmental organisations (such as Scottish 
National Heritage; SNH) or non-governmental organisations (such 
as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds; RSPB; Figure 3). 
However, more than 77% of the sample reported high levels of 
trust in the National Farmers Union (NFU). Interesting contrasts 
emerged from farmers' attitudes towards the three self-help man-
agement options: licenced sale of goose meat; wildlife or bird 
watching tourism; and sport shooting. For instance, more than 
62% of the sample positively valued sport shooting and the sale 
of goose meat whereas the majority (>67%) rated wildlife tourism 
negatively (Figure S1).
4.2 | Factors affecting decisions to shoot geese 
in the games
All three alternative interventions, support for scaring, flat rate 
subsidy and agglomeration payments, significantly decreased de-
cisions to shoot geese in the games (Table 3; Figure S2 and S3). 
Also, participants with more positive attitudes towards wildlife 
tourism were less likely to shoot (log-odds: −0.37, 0.95CI: −0.57 
to −0.17; Table 3). Higher community trust levels strengthened 
the effects of the interventions in reducing farmers' decisions to 
shoot (cf. log-odds of interaction effects in Table 3 and Figure 4a). 
At lower community trust level, the effect of all three treatments 
(the support for deterrent in particular) on farmers' propensity 
to shoot geese were more pronounced (Figure 4a). Predicted 
mean proportions of shooting decisions decreased from 50%–
60% to 20%–30% along increasing measures of community trust 
(Figure 4c). At the highest community trust level, discrepancies 
between the baseline and financial payments became smaller 
(Figure 4a).
Other farmers' real-life traits affected the impact of the interven-
tions in the games; however, their effect size was small. The financial 
payments were more effective at reducing shooting among farmers 
who had more shooting on their own land in real life (self-reported 
estimates of number of geese shot on the respondent's own land for 
the past 12 months including geese shot by others; Table S1), and who 
were more remote (proxied by the total travel time from the main 
city, Kirkwall; Figure 4b,c. There was an increasing effect of the sup-
port for deterrent treatment on shooting for more remote farmers 
(Figure 4c).
Other game variables affected game decisions; decisions to 
shoot geese decreased as participants progressed through a game. 
Higher levels of payments in the monetary treatments were also sig-
nificantly associated with more shooting (Figure S4). However, none 
of the institutional trust and other equity attitudinal variables (nor 
their interactions with treatments) were significant predictors of de-
cisions to shoot geese in the games. While self-reported agricultural 
damage by geese slightly improved model fit, it did not affect farm-
ers' shooting decisions (Table 3).
F I G U R E  3   Diverging stacked bar charts of attitudinal trust and equity—Statements A to D were based on ‘Not at all’ to ‘Very much’ Likert 
scales, Statements D to K were based on ‘Strongly disagree’ to ‘Strongly agree’ [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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F I G U R E  4   Predicted proportions of decisions to shoot geese in each treatment as a function of (a) Interpersonal trust among community 
members, (b) Number of geese shot on farm in real life, (c) Total travel time from the main city. Predicted values computed from the reduced 
model (Table 3) are shown for the average household and group. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals [Colour figure can be 
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Proportion of decisions to shoot 
geese
Log-odds 95% CI
(Intercept: control treatment) −1.35*** −1.69 to −1.01
Deterrents −0.22*** −0.35 to −0.10
Subsidy −0.16** −0.28 to −0.05
Agglomeration −0.21*** −0.34 to −0.09
Rounds within a game −0.47*** −0.52 to −0.43
Rounds within a session 0.01 −0.05 to 0.06
Attitudes towards wildlife tourism −0.37*** −0.57 to −0.17
Crop damage by geese 0.12 −0.09 to 0.33
Total travel time from the main city (a proxy of  
remoteness)
0.16 −0.18 to 0.51
Number of geese shot on own farm (in real life) 0.09 −0.12 to 0.29
Interpersonal trust among community members 
(Community trust)
−0.09 −0.31 to 0.13
Deterrents × Total travel time from the main city 0.12 −0.01 to 0.24
Subsidy × Total travel time from the main city −0.29*** −0.41 to −0.18
Agglomeration × Total travel time from the main city −0.22*** −0.34 to −0.10
Deterrents × Number of geese shot on own farm −0.13* −0.24 to −0.02
Subsidy × Number of geese shot on own farm −0.15* −0.26 to −0.03
Agglomeration × Number of geese shot on own farm −0.21*** −0.32 to −0.09
Deterrents × Community trust −0.27*** −0.39 to −0.14
Subsidy × Community trust −0.12* −0.24 to −0.00






Marginal R2/Conditional R2 0.108/0.296
Bold values indicate coefficient estimates that are statistically significant.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
TA B L E  3   Log-odds estimates 
from the reduced GLMM showing 
the effect of treatments and other 
farmers' characteristics and attitudes on 
participants' propensity to shoot geese 
in the games. Random effects included in 
the model were ‘individuals’ and ‘groups’
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4.3 | Determinants of decisions to provide sacrificial 
crops for geese
The three interventions all significantly increased decisions to pro-
vide sacrificial crops although the effect sizes of the two financial 
treatments were much stronger than the support for deterrents 
(Figure S2 and S3; Table 4). Farmers with more positive attitudes 
towards wildlife tourism (as a conflict mitigation tool) were also 
more likely to provide sacrificial crops (log-odds: 0.37, 0.95CI: 0.11–
0.69; Table 4). The agglomeration payments were more effective 
at encouraging the provision of sacrificial crops when participants' 
perceived equity regarding the allocation of finances for conflict 
management was low (Figure 5c; Table 4). The predicted percent-
ages of habitat decisions in the agglomeration treatment decreased 
from 32% to 9% along increasing levels of equity attitude.
The interaction coefficients of the treatments and farmers' re-
al-life traits showed that farmers were slightly more responsive to 
the two monetary interventions when real-life self-reported crop 
damage was low, and when farmers had more shooting on their own 
lands in real life (proxied by the number of geese shot on farmers' 
land (Table 4; Figure 5a,b).
In addition, higher levels of payments in the monetary treat-
ments were also associated with more sacrificial crops (Figure S4). 
However, unlike shooting decisions, neither remoteness, nor trust 
in neighbouring farmers had a significant effect on farmer decisions 
to provide sacrificial crops. As participants played more rounds 
through the entire game session, they were more likely to provide 
sacrificial crops for geese (Table 4). However, the proportions of sac-
rificial crops slightly decreased as participants progressed within a 
given treatment (defined as ‘rounds in a game’; Figure S3; Table 4).
TA B L E  4   Log-odds estimates from 
the reduced GLMM showing the effect 
of treatments and other household 
characteristics and attitudes on 
participants' propensity to provide 
sacrificial crops in the games. Random 
effects included in the model were 
‘individuals’ and ‘groups’
Predictors
Proportions of decisions to 
provide sacrificial crops
Log-odds Log-odds
Intercept: Control treatment −4.78*** −5.48 to −4.07
Deterrents 0.38* 0.08 to 0.68
Subsidy 2.62*** 2.37 to 2.88
Agglomeration 3.26*** 3.01 to 3.52
Rounds within a game −0.07* −0.12 to −0.01
Rounds within a session 0.08* 0.01 to 0.15
Total travel time from the main city 0.01 −0.66 to 0.68
Crop damage by geese 0.33* 0.01 to 0.64
Equity attitude: Fairness of goose finance allocation in 
Scotland
0.13 −0.20 to 0.46
Number of geese shot on own farm (in real life) −0.50* −0.89 to −0.12
Attitudes towards wildlife tourism 0.37** 0.11 to 0.64
Deterrents × Crop damage by geese −0.17 −0.43 to 0.08
Subsidy × Crop damage by geese −0.26* −0.46 to −0.05
Agglomeration × Crop damage by geese −0.46*** −0.66 to −0.25
Deterrents: × Equity attitude: Fairness of goose finance 
allocation in Scotland
0.00 −0.26 to 0.27
Subsidy: × Equity attitude: Fairness of goose finance 
allocation in Scotland
−0.40*** −0.63 to −0.17
Agglomeration × Equity attitude: Fairness of goose  
finance allocation in Scotland
−0.54*** −0.76 to −0.31
Deterrents × Number of geese shot on own farm 0.06 −0.29 to 0.41
Subsidy × Number of geese shot on own farm 0.72*** 0.42 to 1.03






Marginal R2/Conditional R2 0.293/0.610
Bold values indicate coefficient estimates that are statistically significant.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
     |  171People and NatureRAKOTONARIVO eT Al.
5  | DISCUSSION AND POLICY 
IMPLIC ATIONS
Conservation conflicts are notoriously complex, as involved stake-
holders are not just influenced by material impacts but also by wider 
social and political factors (Madden & McQuinn, 2014). Our study 
highlights the critical role of community interpersonal trust and eq-
uity attitudes in supporting conflict resolution. All three conflict in-
terventions were more likely to lower shooting in the game where 
levels of trust in other community members were higher. These re-
sults are consistent with previous experimental findings where par-
ticipants with higher trust levels were more likely to cooperate and 
for local self-governance institutions to work (Bouma et al., 2008; 
Gelcich et al., 2013; Ostrom & Walker, 2003). In contrast to these 
previous studies, we did not find a significant effect of trust in conser-
vation and government agencies (despite low levels; Figure 3), possi-
bly because the framing of the game made no explicit reference to the 
agencies. The agglomeration payments led to an increased provision 
of sacrificial crops among farmers with negative attitudes towards 
the current allocation of goose finances in Scotland. This suggests 
that a more equitable redistribution of goose finances across differ-
ent localities with goose-agriculture conflicts could improve farmers' 
attitudes and hence the efficiency of financial payments.
The role of increased community trust in promoting pro- 
conservation behaviour highlights the need to improve social cohesion, 
for example through community-based organisations and commu-
nity workshops. Such improvement in community cohesion would 
in turn foster shared values among communities and improve struc-
tures for more cohesive democratic societies (International Institute 
for Democracy & Electoral Assistance, 2009; Young, Thompson, 
et al., 2016).
The game results also revealed that performance-based pay-
ments encouraged the provision of conservation outcomes, that 
is, reduced shooting and increased sacrificial crops for geese. 
Providing financial payments to people negatively affected by wild-
life has been a common strategy in managing conservation con-
flicts (Dickman et al., 2011). However, these payments have been 
prioritised for highly valued species such as large carnivores (e.g. 
Zabel & Holm-Müller, 2008) or birds with a higher protected status 
such as barnacle geese (McKenzie & Shaw, 2017) but have not been 
considered for unprotected or partially protected species such as 
greylag geese despite the significant agricultural damage they cause 
to farmers in Orkney (Milne, 2018). While conservation payments 
have some challenges, such as determining the eligibility criteria, 
the appropriate payment level and monitoring methods (Dickman 
et al., 2011), they might reduce the financial impacts of greylag 
geese and improve distributional equity attitudes. Besides using 
monetary incentives to encourage pro-conservation behaviour, fi-
nancial payments can also be a part of agri-environment and insur-
ance schemes to offset the high-economic costs imposed by geese 
at a local scale.
One alternative conflict intervention is to channel some of the 
revenue generated by wildlife, for instance through wildlife tourism, 
to indirectly help offset costs and increase farmer tolerance towards 
problem species (Dickman et al., 2011). In Orkney, geese bring signif-
icant economic benefits by attracting winter tourism by bird watchers 
and shooters. Farmers can also earn revenue from allowing tourists 
to shoot geese on their lands. Our findings suggest that farmers with 
more positive attitudes towards wildlife tourism were more willing to 
support goose conservation interests. However, only 12% of the total 
sample had positive attitudes towards wildlife tourism as a conflict 
mitigation tool (Figure 3). Debriefing interviews with game partici-
pants revealed that while wildlife tourism significantly contributes to 
Orkney's economy, wildlife-related revenue is still limited and does not 
reflect the costs that individual farmers incur from crop damage by 
geese. Importantly, not every farmer equally benefits from tourism, 
especially those who are further away from the mainland, which may 
generate further social conflicts.
F I G U R E  5   Predicted proportions of decisions to provide sacrificial crops in each treatment as a function of (a) Equity attitude: fairness 
of goose finance allocation in Scotland, (b) Number of geese shot on farm in real life, (c) Percentage of crop damage by geese. Predicted 
values computed from the reduced model (Table 4) are shown for the average household and group. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence 
intervals [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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The success of conservation payments in our study was also a 
contingent on real-life shooting intensity on farmers' lands; farmers 
were more responsive to the payments at higher levels of shooting. 
The control measures implemented as part of the ‘adaptive manage-
ment pilot’ were perceived by farmers to have only capped goose 
numbers but not significantly reduced the population (Milne, 2018). 
These licenced shootings have not, therefore, reduced farmers' 
concerns regarding the agricultural damage by geese. Other socio- 
economic factors strengthened the effectiveness of conservation 
payments in increasing participants' willingness to support goose 
conservation, such as lower agricultural damage and increased re-
moteness. More remote farmers (especially those on the isles) were 
more responsive to financial payments. Post-game debriefings re-
vealed that in response to shooting pressure on the mainland, geese 
were displaced to more remote areas where there was very little 
impact before, and where there is seldom shooting because of the 
increased costs. As a result, more remote farmers were therefore 
more exposed to agricultural damage, and thus valued external help 
more highly.
Our study indicates that conflict interventions will need to go 
beyond understanding the ecological system (e.g. a focus on shoot-
ing bag targets) and seek to develop collaborative approaches that 
might lead to ownership of conflict interventions and improved 
social outcomes (Redpath et al., 2017). Collaborative governance 
strengthens democracy and improves equity attitudes by dealing 
with issues related to a lack of both legitimacy and acceptance of 
top-down approaches; improved equity might in turn lead to better 
conservation outcomes, as we found in this study. Such collabora-
tive approaches could be materialised by the creation of committees 
tasked with understanding conflict context and indicators, develop-
ing conflict interventions, and monitoring and information sharing 
(Redpath et al., 2017).
Where conservation policy and practice have prevented farmers 
from taking direct action against crop-raiding species (e.g. by limit-
ing shooting), farmers may expect government agencies to assume 
responsibility for providing adequate crop protection against wild-
life (Hill, 2004). This can encourage people to expect compensation 
or extensive efforts from government agencies to control wildlife 
populations. If these expectations are not met, self-help arrange-
ments might not suffice and might in the worst case further ac-
centuate farmers' resentment towards conservation agencies (Hill 
et al., 2017).
6  | E XPERIMENTAL GAMES TO STUDY 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Experimental games, also known as framed field experiments, 
are emerging as an important tool in the examination of natu-
ral resource dilemmas, with a range of applications in irrigation 
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 2016), fisheries (Cardenas et al., 2009), agri-
culture (Bell et al., 2016) and forests (Cardenas et al., 2009). Games 
which include dynamic simulations have improved our conceptual 
understanding of complex socio-ecological systems and human 
behaviour (Redpath et al., 2018). The constructivist approach to 
games, which includes board games and role-playing games have 
been used to promote engagement and foster dialogue among 
stakeholders (Garcia et al., 2016). Games have also been used as 
learning and facilitation tools among local communities by simu-
lating long-term behavioural change over the span of a few hours 
(Janssen et al., 2014).
This study provides some of the first experimental evidence 
for the roles of games in addressing the multifaceted complexities 
of conservation conflicts embedded in socio-ecological systems 
(Mason, et al., 2018). Our study shows how complex the behavioural 
effects of varying policy interventions and their associations with 
social factors. The debriefing interviews also gave us additional in-
sights into the complexity of farmer motivations. Our results provide 
support for the importance of innovative financial instruments in en-
couraging pro-conservation behaviour and allow for more targeted 
conflict interventions. Our findings also highlight the importance of 
socio-political elements such as community trust and equity atti-
tudes in managing conservation conflicts in addition to addressing 
material losses to wildlife.
As experimental games are often designed to be simplistic and 
narrow in scope to isolate potential confounding effects, doubts 
might exist about the relevance of their results for predicting be-
haviour in the real world and the scope for generalisation (Bouma 
et al., 2008; Gelcich et al., 2013; Jackson, 2012). For instance, the 
games were set in a way that shooting reduces goose number and 
potentially leads to extinction, which would be a negative conserva-
tion outcome. However, there might be shooting levels that are eco-
logically sustainable. While it would have been ideal to incorporate 
such socio-ecological optimum in our game design, it would have 
come at the cost of tractability. Despite such limitations, the games 
provided farmers with a platform for trading off goose population 
against farming interests.
Games are part of a larger body of experimental findings that 
cumulatively can lead to improved insights (Janssen et al., 2014). 
We developed a game as a starting point for a conservation conflict 
where we know very little about farmers' perspectives and decision- 
making (but see Pollard et al., 2019). Our results demonstrate a 
number of relevant associations between farmers' experimental 
play and their real-life characteristics. In addition, the debriefing 
interviews uncovered rationales that are in line with the patterns 
observed. Most importantly, our experimental approach adds rele-
vant insights and empirical evidence to existing conflict management 
tools (Young, et al., 2016) and is widely applicable to other conflict 
contexts.
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